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SECURITY INFORMATION

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30 September 1952

Memorandum for Mr. Becker

Subject: Project [REDACTED] 25X1A2d2

The following points have come up in the preliminary work on this project, and are discussed in this memorandum for your information and any action you think necessary.

1. Use of existing materials. As a general principle, maximum use should be made of estimates, O/RR papers, and O/CI IM's and material in the Current Intelligence Digest. The estimative sections should make use of current estimates, giving conclusions verbatim if possible. To this end I am reviewing all estimates and [REDACTED] is checking 25X1A9a the others, and we are sorting them against the outline headings.

2. Cross-references and references to additional material. Some subjects will be discussed in separate places to conform to the policy book, although they are closely related. (E.g., Soviet Bloc economic situation and East-West trade problems.) All such cases should certainly be marked by cross-references. In addition, I think the book should note the existence of more detailed up-to-date studies on subjects reviewed in it. Maybe the new President will not want to read these, but other high officials are likely to get the book and to wish to go further into particular matters. The book should be at least a partial bibliography, and a really complete one as to currently valid estimates.

3. Limitations of treatment. I think a measure of self-limitation should be exercised in the handling of matters which are of an intelligence nature, but on which the new President would probably look to other sources for fuller and more definitive treatment. Examples are the situation in [REDACTED] and the status of negotiations to which the US is a party. This is in fact done in all our material, but the problem will be a little harder to handle in this project, which will attempt to touch on everything of major significance.

4. Page numbering. The Budget Books are extremely hard to find your way around in, for lack of a consecutive numbering system. The loose-leaf idea precludes such numbering -- at least beyond the first shot -- unless arbitrary blocks of numbers are set aside. This seems cumbersome. Instead, I think we should number to the section headings, with page numbers in parentheses, thus: "I.A.(1)", "II.B.2(3)".

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This is not to be part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

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5. Organization of individual country studies. With rare exceptions, I think we should use the same general headings as in the Budget Books, i.e.: 1. Political Situation (or Stability and Orientation). 2. Military. 3. Economic. 4. Indications of Trends and Issues. 5. CIA Estimate of Probable Developments. The first three would be basic material and would include underlying trends (such as Sovietization of the Satellites). The fourth would be in effect a "What to watch for" and would be limited to the really critical points. So far as possible, the fifth section should be co-extensive with the fourth and should be confined to the final judgment. Using France as an example, the result might read somewhat as follows:

"4. Indications of trends and issues.

The Pinay Government will probably be confronted with a serious crisis when the Assembly convenes on 12 December. Formerly dissident members of the Gaullist party have indicated that they will oppose Pinay, and there are strong indications that the MRP will withdraw its support over the issue of aid to schools.

With respect to its military contribution to NATO, the French submission of its plans to the OEEC indicated a heavy reliance on increased US aid and presented no proposals for meeting basic problems of taxation and production.

"5. CIA Estimate of Probable Developments.

The Pinay government may survive the immediate crisis, but is unlikely to continue in power unless it achieves a better solution than hitherto to financial problems. Its most likely successor would be

France is unlikely to meet her tentative Lisbon commitments for 1953 unless granted increased US aid "

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